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GLOSSARY
Byte

A byte is a group of 8 bits, also called a character. Computer
storage space is measured in bytes. A kilobyte represents 1000
bytes, a megabyte represents 1000 KB, a gigabyte represents
1000 MB, and a terabyte represents 1000 GB (Oualline, 1997).

Computer Forensics

Also

known

as

cyberforensics,

is

the

preservation,

identiﬁcation, extraction, documentation, and interpretation
of computer media for evidence of criminal acts (Kruse &
Heiser, 2002).
Cybercrime

Also known as computer crime or digital crime, is a crime
that utilizes computer technology to commit crimes (Cliﬀord,
2011).

Cyberspace

The virtual environment (Cliﬀord, 2011).

Cyberstalking

The use of digital media to harass or threaten another person
(Easttom, 2014).

Digital Evidence

Information that has been processed and analyzed to
determine the relevant data for an investigation that supports
or refutes investigative ﬁndings (Easttom, 2014).

Digital Forensics

The analysis of digital evidence which includes network
forensics, computer forensics, mobile device forensics and
malware forensics (Casey, 2011).

Fraud

Any attempt to gain ﬁnancial reward through deception
(Easttom, 2014).

x
Internet

The worldwide network of networks which use the TCP/IP
protocol to facilitate information exchange (Kroll Ontrack,
2015).

Mobile Forensics

The process of searching the contents of cell phones (Easttom,
2014).

Network

A group of computers or devices that is connected together for
the exchange of data and sharing of resources (Kroll Ontrack,
2015).
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ABSTRACT
Gurule, Kaitlyn M.S., Purdue University, August 2016. An Analysis of Digital
Forensic Units. Major Professor: Kathryn Seigfried-Spellar.
Technology is growing rapidly. The ﬁrst computer, ENIAC, was built in 1946 and it
was not until 1975 that personal computers existed (Knight, 2014). Now, computers
are seen everywhere. It is rare to see a person without a computer, such as a mobile
phone. As technology grows so does computer crimes. Computer crimes, for the
purposes of this study, are crimes committed using digital media as a target of a
crime, to assist in a crime, or as an incidental element in a crime. Criminals are
taking advantage of the new technology and using it to their advantage. Easy access
to technology makes it easier for criminals to commit new and old crimes. Law
Enforcement agencies are having a diﬃcult time processing all the digital media in
an eﬀective and eﬃcient manner. Criminals, however, do not stop committing
crimes. Therefore, creating a backlog of cases for law enforcement investigators.
Technology creates a variety of diﬃculties that law enforcement agencies must
overcome to successfully process digital media. In order to help overcome these
diﬃculties, some states have created specialized and non-specialized cybercrime
units. These cybercrime units work on processing the digital evidence used in
computer crimes. A study was conducted analyzing these units. It suggested the
specialized units operate more eﬀectively than the non-specialized. This study also
showed the lack of knowledge regarding standard procedures and the need for more
training, funding, and personnel.

1

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Technology is continuously growing throughout the world. With this
expansion in technology, more and more people are taking advantage of the new
technologies and using it to commit crimes (Brenner, 2004, 2011; Carnegie Mellon
University, 2015). This led to the creation of computer forensics which involves the
processing and analyzing of digital media to obtain evidence to be used in a court of
law (Britz, 2009). Law enforcement agencies are having to examine many diﬀerent
types of digital media, but they are having a diﬃcult time processing the amount of
digital media being received in an eﬀective and eﬃcient manner (Cliﬀord, 2011;
Goodison, Davis, & Jackson, 2015). The Federal Bureau of Investigation as well as
multiple states have set up cybercrime units to help process digital media (Jones &
Valli, 2008; Schmitknecht, 2004). This study analyzed many diﬀerent types of
cybercrime units to determine whether or not they successfully process digital
evidence and whether some units work better than others.

1.1 Scope
This study gathered data from multiple cybercrime units. The cybercrime
units were classiﬁed into two groups: non-specialized and specialized. Information
regarding the cybercrime unit as well as the digital evidence each unit has worked
on was gathered and analyzed to determine how well the units were processing the
digital evidence. This information included the number of personnel the unit had,
the tools the unit members had, the number of cybercrime cases they received, the
number of mobile phones processed, the number of computer hard drives processed,
and so on. Information regarding why the unit was established, are oﬃcers being
trained and/or certiﬁed, are resources being shared and are resources easier to
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obtain was also gathered to determine if the structure of the units have an eﬀect on
processing digital media. Gathering this data allowed for an analysis on whether or
not the units were successfully processing digital media and if the specialized
cybercrime units were working more eﬃciently and eﬀectively.

1.2 Signiﬁcance
Over the centuries, crime has evolved with the existence of new technological
resources (Holt, Bosslar, & Seigfried-Spellar, 2015). The capabilities that computers
possess make it easier for users to gain access to a multitude of knowledge, to
communicate almost instantly with someone on the other side of the world, and to
create new technologies. While this alone seems like a positive advancement, there
are still people who utilize this new technology to commit crimes. The crimes being
committed include, but are not limited to, white-collar crimes, murder, terrorism,
counterfeiting, drug dealing, and child pornography (Easttom, 2014). It is not only
computer crimes that are the problem. Most crimes, regardless of being a computer
crime, includes some sort of digital media (Cliﬀord, 2011; Easttom, 2014).
Processing digital media takes time and can easily double when multiple parties of a
crime exist and each have their own digital device (Goodison et al., 2015).
Due to the vast amount of technology currently in existence, the vast amount
of digital devices individuals have, and the rate at which technology changes, it is
diﬃcult for law enforcement agencies and investigators to keep up (Easttom, 2014).
A study was conducted to determine if cybercrime units are successfully analyzing
digital evidence and whether or not the specialized units are working more
eﬀectively than the non-specialized units. Determining if and why certain units are
more eﬀective may provide information to support the creation of similar units in
other areas. Analyzing the cybercrime units may provide information that can
deﬁnitively state these types of units are succeeding. This knowledge can also
provide data that can help determine if existing units need to make changes to
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better meet their goals and to process digital evidence more eﬃciently and more
eﬀectively.

1.3 Research Question
The goal of this study was to determine: Does having a specialized
cybercrime unit increase eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness in law enforcement agencies?
Eﬃciency was measured by the increase in number of cases and digital
devices processed and eﬀectiveness was measured by the reduction in the backlog of
cases and the time taken to close a case.

1.4 Assumptions
The following assumptions were inherent to this study:
• The law enforcement units examined during this study have records of the
cybercrimes they worked on.
• The law enforcement units presented legitimate records.
• The law enforcement units had data for at least one year after opening the
unit.

1.5 Limitations
The limitations inherent to this study were as follows:
• The study was limited by the participation of each of the law enforcement
units.
• The records the law enforcement units have may not all be the same across
every unit examined.
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• The units may not have numerical data prior to establishing the units.

1.6 Delimitations
The delimitations of this study included:
• Not all law enforcement units were analyzed.

1.7 Summary
Criminals are taking advantage of the expansion of technology and are
making it diﬃcult for law enforcement agencies to process all the digital evidence in
an eﬃcient and timely manner. Cybercrime units have been developed to help
mitigate these circumstances. A study was completed to determine if specialized
cybercrime units were operating more eﬀectively and eﬃciently than the
non-specialized cybercrime units.
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CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE
Digital forensics is a relatively new ﬁeld compared to all the other
sub-disciplines of forensic sciences (Holt et al., 2015). Consider the forensic science
sub-discipline of ﬁngerprints. Fingerprints were used by the Chinese in the 700s to
determine the identity of documents (Inman & Rudin, 2000). Fingerprinting
forensics has had over a thousand years to formalize and establish their forensic
processes. The ﬁrst computer, the ENIAC, was not even built until 1946 and was
not fully operational until 1947 (Bergin, 2000). According to Cliﬀord (2011), the
history of computer crime started in the 1960s and was not recognized legally until
the 1970s. Therefore, the ﬁeld of digital forensics has only had about 45 years to
evolve and establish their forensic processes.
Digital forensics evolved from computer forensics. Computer forensics refers
to the processing and analysis of digital media to obtain evidence to present in a
court of law (Britz, 2009). Digital forensics “refers to the analysis of digital evidence,
which includes network forensics (Internet traﬃc), computer forensics, mobile-device
forensics (e.g., cell phone), and malware forensics (e.g., viruses)” (Casey, 2011; Holt
et al., 2015, p. 329). Therefore, computer forensics is a subset of digital forensics.

2.1 The Evolution and History of Digital Forensics
There have been three phases in this evolution. The ﬁrst phase is considered
to be the pre-forensics or the Ad Hoc phase. Computers were being developed but
were originally owned by government agencies and universities (Holt et al., 2015).
During this time, crimes involving computers comprised of stealing computer
hardware (Holt et al., 2015). In the mid-1970s, personal computers became more
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widespread and traditional crimes, such as embezzlement and fraud, were now being
committed using this new technology (Cliﬀord, 2011; Holt et al., 2015).
Computers were, and still are, used as an instrument to commit traditional
crimes (Cliﬀord, 2011), however, the tasks computers could complete and the time
in which they could complete them led to new forms of criminal behavior (Cliﬀord,
2011). The Internet was established in 1966 and its construction began in 1969
(Hafner & Lyon, 1998). The Internet was not widely used until the 1990s when the
World Wide Web was established (Berghel, 1867). This new technology led to even
more new forms of criminal behavior, such as hacking and malware. Not only are
new crimes involving technology being created, but traditional crimes are being
committed in new ways using technology. These traditional crimes include child
pornography, fraud, and harassment (Casey, 2011; Holt et al., 2015). Laws in the
1970s were not written to accommodate computer related crimes, making it hard to
prosecute computer criminal behavior (Cliﬀord, 2011).
Senator Ribikoﬀ proposed the ﬁrst cybercrime legislation, the Federal
Computer Systems Protection Act of 1977 (Cliﬀord, 2011). Although this act was
not passed, Senator Ribikoﬀ provided awareness for the need of computer crime
laws. Florida became the ﬁrst state to implement a computer crime law, the Florida
Computer Crimes Act of 1978 (Holt et al., 2015). During this phase, law
enforcement agencies and corporations began to collect computer evidence and use
computer forensic tools to obtain physical evidence (Charters, 2009; Holt et al.,
2015). However, when these cases were brought to the courts, the methods and
reliability of the forensic tools were questioned, especially since the original evidence
was being analyzed and changes during this analysis was aﬀecting the original
evidence (Holt et al., 2015). The ﬁeld, at this time, was not structuralized, and
suﬃcient tools, processes, and procedures did not exist in the early 1980s (Charters,
2009; Holt et al., 2015).
The second phase, starting in the mid-1980s, is considered the structured
phase (Charters, 2009). During this phase, computer crime laws and computer
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forensic procedures were established (Holt et al., 2015). Laws were developed to
condemn forms of hacking and wire fraud (Charters, 2009). Organizations began to
create “appropriate use” policies and implementation and response methods
(Charters, 2009). Courts also encouraged the need for forensic tools and procedures
that could withstand courtroom challenges (Charters, 2009; Holt et al., 2015).
Professional organizations began to form in response to the continuously changing
technology. One such group was the Scientiﬁc Working Group on Digital Evidence
(SWGDE) (Whitcomb, 2002). The ﬁrst oﬃcial deﬁnition for digital evidence was
created during a SWGDE meeting: “any information of probative value that is
stored or transmitted in a binary form” (Whitcomb, 2007, p. 7).
Towards the end of this phase is when the evolution from computer forensics
to digital forensics occurred (Holt et al., 2015). The investigations began to include
more forms of digital evidence, not just computers, such as mobile phones, cameras,
and gaming consoles (e.g., PlayStation, Xbox) (Casey, 2011). These devices could
be used for storage, communication, or as a means to search the Internet.
Therefore, all of these devices may need to be analyzed as evidence during an
investigation. These diﬀerent devices and methods for analyzing them provided a
need for more forensic tools.
The need for more forensic tools led to the third phase. The third phase,
starting in the early 2000s, is known as the Enterprise phase or the Golden Age
(Charters, 2009; Garﬁnkel, 2010). Forensic tools were developed and allowed to be
used to analyze digital evidence (Holt et al., 2015). These tools help aid in the
investigation process for analyzing digital media. The collection, preservation and
analysis of digital media heavily rely on forensic tools (Garﬁnkel, 2010; Guo, Slay, &
Beckett, 2009). The amount of storage a single device can contain has also increased
and can be time consuming to complete a manual analysis, therefore, making the
tools beneﬁcial.
This third phase has led to the debate about whether digital forensics is a
science (Gupta & Rogers, 2012). In 2008, the American Academy of Forensic
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Science declared digital forensics as a scientiﬁc discipline (Olivier & Gruner, 2013).
However, some do not view digital forensics as a science, but as technology. DeVore
stated the diﬀerence between science and technology (DeVore, 1980). DeVore
argued science involved exploring and understanding, while technology helps
individuals to accomplish tasks. Gupta and Rogers (2012) argue digital forensics is
both a science and technology, and is therefore, a technoscience. Investigative
procedures depend on growing technology, however, digital forensic organizations
use scientiﬁc methods to devise best practice methods within digital forensics.
Many diﬀerent methods for analyzing digital evidence have been created and are
discussed more in the following section.

2.2 Cyberforensic Process Models
It was not until 1984 when the Federal Bureau of Investigations and other
law enforcement agencies started to formalize the process for examining digital
media for evidence (Noblett, Pollitt, & Presley, 2000). The digital forensics process,
established thus far, “is to recover, analyze, and present computer-based material in
such a way that it can be used as evidence in a court of law” (Easttom, 2014,
p. 295). Four common steps exist in a digital forensic investigation: identiﬁcation,
acquisition, analysis, and presentation (Casey, 2011). The identiﬁcation step
involves identifying sources of digital evidence (e.g., computers, iPods, iPads,
Kindles, USB drives, PlayStations, mobile phones) (ISO/IEC, 2012). The second
step, acquisition, is to retrieve and preserve the digital evidence (ISO/IEC, 2012).
The third step, analysis, involves the recovery and extraction of data (ISO/IEC,
2012). The fourth step, presentation, is to create a report containing information
relevant to the investigation (ISO/IEC, 2012). There are several diﬀerent models
that have been developed that range in complexity and steps to gather, evaluate,
and present digital evidence, however, an oﬃcial standard has not yet been agreed
upon for all agencies to use (Casey, 2011).
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While four common steps exist, many models have been developed. These
models aim at generalizing the digital forensic process for all digital media. Data
from diﬀerent digital media devices are retrieved diﬀerently (Easttom, 2014).
Therefore, it is diﬃcult to establish a single process of digital media evidence
recovery for every scenario. Casey (2011) explains how the process models are either
too detailed or too general and do not account for all scenarios. Casey (2011) also
created a ﬁgure to display a few of the diﬀerent process models and their steps
(shown in Figure 2.1). It shows the steps within the processes side-by-side to show
how the processes relate and how they diﬀer.

Figure 2.1. Shows diﬀerent digital forensic process models with
both similar and distinct steps. Adapted from “Digital Evidence
And Computer Crime: Forensic Science, Computers and the Internet
(Third ed.) p. 189. Copyright 2011 by Elsevier Inc.”

In 1984, the Computer Forensic Investigative Process model was established
and consisted of four steps: acquisition, identiﬁcation, evaluation, and admission
(Yusoﬀ, Ismail, & Hassan, 2011). In 2001, the Digital Forensics Research Workshop
suggested a six step model of: identiﬁcation, preservation, collection, examination,
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analysis, and presentation (Yusoﬀ et al., 2011). Both of these models did not allow
investigators to go to a previous step in that they are linear models. Therefore, the
Abstract Digital Forensics Model (ADFM) was created in 2002 by Reith, Carr, and
Gunsch. This model added three steps and also allowed for the investigator to
continuously go back and forth between the examination and analysis phases
(Yusoﬀ et al., 2011). The nine steps within this model are: identiﬁcation,
preparation, approach strategy, preservation, collection, examination, analysis,
presentation, and returning evidence (Baryamureeba & Tushabe, 2004).
The Integrated Digital Investigation Model (IDIP) was developed in 2003 by
Carrier and Spaﬀord. The IDIP model consisted of ﬁve sections of phases: the
readiness phases, deployment phases, physical crime scene investigation phases,
digital crime scene investigation phases, and the presentation phases (Baryamureeba
& Tushabe, 2004). This model allows for interaction between the physical and
digital crime scene investigation phases, however, the other phases are separate and
are proceeded through linearly.
The Enhanced Digital Investigation Process Model (EIDIP) was developed in
2004 by Baryamureeba and Tushabe. This model consists of ﬁve main phases:
readiness phases, deployment phases, traceback phases, dynamite phases, and
review phases (Baryamureeba & Tushabe, 2004). This model allows for the
investigation to iterate through the phases, meaning each phase can step back to the
previous phase if needed.
The Hierarchical Objectives-Based Framework for Digital Investigations
Process (HOBFDIP) was another model created in 2005 by Beebe and Clark. The
HOBFDIP model consists of six steps: preparation, incident response, data
collection, data analysis, presentation of ﬁndings, and incident closure (Beebe &
Clark, 2005). The steps within this model are iterative, like the EIDIP model,
however, each step breaks down into further steps.
Rogers (2007) criticized some of the models. He stated, the ADFM is too
generic and not easily testable. The IDIP model is still too abstract and linear. The
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EIDIP model does not present new information and the sub-tasks are too confusing.
The HOBFDIP is incomplete and tries to include everything making it too complex.
Since these previous models still presented issues, Rogers came up with the Digital
Crime Scene Analysis model in 2007. This model consisted of two main phases with
a total of six sub-steps. The two phases consisted of corpus delicti and the lab
(Rogers, 2007). Within the corpus delicti phase, the sub-tasks include evidence
identiﬁcation, evidence collection, and transportation. The lab phase consisted of
the examination, analysis, and reporting of evidence (Rogers, 2007).
These models are just a few examples of all the diﬀerent processes that have
been developed to try to create a standard process for all law enforcement agencies
to follow. However, it is diﬃcult to create a model that will provide the necessary
detail to process all diﬀerent types of digital media and not be too complex.

2.3 A Growing Problem
Crimes involving computers are typically classiﬁed as one of three categories:
crimes in which a computer is used as a tool in the crime, crimes in which the
computer is the target of the crime, and crimes in which the computer is incidental
(Brenner, 2004; Cliﬀord, 2011; Goodman, 1997). Online fraud, theft of funds or
information, embezzlement, stalking, forgery, homicide, and the creation and/or
dissemination of child pornography are all examples of crimes in which the
computer is used as a tool (Brenner, 2004; Cliﬀord, 2011). Computers as a target in
a crime include hacking, cracking, and distributed denial of service attacks
(Brenner, 2004; Cliﬀord, 2011). Crimes in which the computer is incidental to the
crime includes crimes such as a drug dealer storing ﬁnancial data of his buyers or
the use of a computer to write a blackmail letter (Brenner, 2004; Cliﬀord, 2011). In
this case, computers are used as a “ﬁling cabinet”. With the expansion of
technology, more and more of these crimes are being committed.
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As stated above, child pornography is a crime in which the computer is used
as a tool. Law enforcement agencies focus highly on child pornography related
crimes. National Center for Missing & Exploited Children (NCMEC) helps law
enforcement with cases of missing and exploited children. In 2014, NCMEC received
1.1 million reports related to child exploitation, which increased signiﬁcantly from
505,280 reports in 2013 (National Center for Missing & Exploited Children, 2014).
In one year, the amount of reports NCMEC received almost doubled (National
Center for Missing & Exploited Children, 2014). Child exploitation, child
pornography, online enticement, child sex traﬃcking, and child molestation are the
most prominent type of cybercrime cases (Cliﬀord, 2011).
The Internet also makes it possible to easily commit so many other types of
crimes as well, such as auto fraud, email scams, intimidation/extortion scams, real
estate fraud, etc. (Internet Crime Complaint Center, 2014). The Internet Crime
Complaint Center (IC3) was created in 2000 in order to handle these Internet
crimes (Internet Crime Complaint Center, 2014). These Internet crimes do not
include child exploitation crimes or crimes in which the computer is incidental. In
2013, the IC3 received 262,813 complaints and increased to 269,422 in 2014. The
cost of these reported complaints was $800,492,073 (Internet Crime Complaint
Center, 2014). The individual states loss is shown in Table 2.1. The number of
complaints that the IC3 received from each individual state is shown in Table 2.2.
Both tables rank the states from 1 to 51 because of the addition of District of
Columbia as a separate entity. The data from these tables show the impact of a
single complaint can cost thousands of dollars.
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Table 2.1
Dollar Loss Per State Reported to IC3
Rank

State

Dollar Loss

Rank

State

Dollar Loss

1

California

$131,363,796

27

Oklahoma

$6,240,131

2

Florida

$52,544,107

28

Utah

$6,172,314

3

Texas

$50,116,593

29

Louisiana

$5,868,218

4

New York

$47,150,859

30

Alabama

$5,529,072

5

Arizona

$25,399,954

31

Kentucky

$5,342,414

6

Pennsylvania

$20,806,848

32

Kansas

$4,378,440

7

Illinois

$20,685,294

33

New Mexico

$4,177,508

8

New Jersey

$19,232,722

34

Arkansas

$3,972,610

9

Virginia

$16,571,859

35

Nebraska

$3,785,798

10

Georgia

$15,847,730

36

Idaho

$3,380,639

11

Washington

$14,780,493

37

New Hampshire

$3,025,825

12

North Carolina

$13,362,999

38

Iowa

$2,687,857

13

Michigan

$12,407,668

39

Mississippi

$2,580,678

14

Ohio

$12,345,292

40

Hawaii

$2,497,141

15

Massachusetts

$12,309,742

41

Delaware

$2,434,469

16

Nevada

$12,294,762

42

West Virginia

$2,330,137

17

Colorado

$11,487,488

43

District of Columbia

$1,551,758

18

Connecticut

$11,478,793

44

Rhode Island

$1,525,758

19

Minnesota

$9,441,547

45

North Dakota

$1,495,117

20

Wisconsin

$9,235,027

46

Alaska

$1,273,764

21

Oregon

$9,178,386

47

Wyoming

$1,236,741

22

South Carolina

$9,077,367

48

Vermont

$1,165,746

23

Maryland

$9,009,877

49

South Dakota

$1,023,368

24

Missouri

$7,156,094

50

Montana

$847,657

25

Tennessee

$6,453,385

51

Maine

$843,184

26

Indiana

$6,264,190

Note. IC3 = Internet Crime Complaint Center. Percentages are based on the
total losses reported from all states and the District of Columbia. Adapted from
2014 Internet Crime Report by the Internet Crime Complaint Center, 2014, p. 21.
Copyright 2014 by the Internet Crime Complaint Center.
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Table 2.2
Number of Complaints Reported to IC3
#

State

Number of Complaints

#

State

Number of Complaints

1

California

30,923

27

Oklahoma

2,027

2

Florida

18,637

28

Utah

1,825

3

Texas

16,954

29

Louisiana

2,382

4

New York

14,430

30

Alabama

3,202

5

Arizona

6,040

31

Kentucky

2,346

6

Pennsylvania

8,138

32

Kansas

1,688

7

Illinois

7,746

33

New Mexico

1,504

8

New Jersey

7,028

34

Arkansas

2,053

9

Virginia

7,112

35

Nebraska

880

10

Georgia

5,706

36

Idaho

1,057

11

Washington

6,388

37

New Hampshire

904

12

North Carolina

5,724

38

Iowa

1,454

13

Michigan

5,633

39

Mississippi

1,315

14

Ohio

6,114

40

Hawaii

1,020

15

Massachusetts

4,182

41

Delaware

802

16

Nevada

3,716

42

West Virginia

1,088

17

Colorado

4,953

43

District of Columbia

806

18

Connecticut

2,295

44

Rhode Island

582

19

Minnesota

2,876

45

North Dakota

360

20

Wisconsin

3,231

46

Alaska

2,379

21

Oregon

2,906

47

Wyoming

561

22

South Carolina

2,836

48

Vermont

382

23

Maryland

5,677

49

South Dakota

336

24

Missouri

3,487

50

Montana

691

25

Tennessee

3,909

51

Maine

726

26

Indiana

4,102

Note. IC3 = Internet Crime Complaint Center. Adapted from 2014 Internet Crime Report by the
Internet Crime Complaint Center, 2014, p. 24-40. Copyright 2014 by the Internet Crime Complaint
Center.
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While child pornography and Internet crime cases are increasing and adding
to the backlog of crimes law enforcement agencies face, crimes in which the
computer is incidental (and technically not a computer crime) are also contributing
to the backlog. The drug cases in which the drug dealer takes a picture of
themselves with their drugs or has text messages stating they will buy or sell drugs
on their mobile devices add to the backlog. Homicide crimes, stalking, robberies are
all considered traditional crimes, however, even these crimes consist of some sort of
digital evidence that needs processing for evidence (Cliﬀord, 2011; Holt et al., 2015).
Almost every crime involves at least one digital device (Cliﬀord, 2011). The amount
of digital evidence being received is diﬃcult for law enforcement agencies to handle.

2.4 Challenges in Cyberforensics & Law Enforcement
One study showed that the issues, listed by priority, that the digital forensics
community faces are: education\training\certiﬁcation, technologies, encryption,
data acquisition, tools, the legal justice system, evidence correlation, research, and
funding (Rogers & Seigfried, 2004). This study was completed a decade later by
Breitinger and Baggili (2015) and showed the priority of these issues have remained
the same. According to Breitinger and Baggili (2015), the priority of issues were:
education\training\certiﬁcation, technologies, tools, evidence correlation, research,
encryption, the legal justice system, and data acquisition and funding. Law
enforcement oﬃcers are not trained in computer forensics, and therefore, they do
not necessarily know the steps for the collection and analysis of digital media
(Goodison et al., 2015). For example, when an oﬃcer ﬁnds a mobile device on the
scene and needs it to be analyzed for evidence, the “best-practice” method of
collection is to turn the device oﬀ or place the device in airplane mode (National
Institute of Justice, 2008). Unless oﬃcers are informed of this process, they do not
complete this process and it is possible that the device can be wiped of its data.
Therefore, it may not be possible to retrieve any evidence from the device. While
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there is training available for investigators, the funding to attend the training
session or to receive certiﬁcation is also lacking for many agencies (Holt et al., 2015;
Rogers & Seigfried, 2004). There is also no established set of certiﬁcations or
trainings that an investigator must complete.
Another problem that law enforcement agencies face is the diﬀerent type of
digital media devices and the diﬀerent software installed on those devices. Digital
media devices that law enforcement may need to analyze includes, but is not limited
to, mobile devices, hard drives, tablets, cloud storage drives, ﬂash drives,
CD-ROMs, diskettes, cameras (Cliﬀord, 2011). The evidence from each of these
devices is retrieved diﬀerently. In order to recover data from a mobile device, law
enforcement uses the UFED Cellebrite device that uses an automated process
depending on the model of the phone and sometimes the network the mobile device
is on (Cellebrite, 2015). When recovering data from hard drives, ﬂash drives, or
tablets, the software tools Forensic Toolkit (FTK) or Encase are used to make an
image, a bit by bit copy, of the drive and to analyze the data found (AccessData,
2015; Guidance Software, 2015). FTK is used by more than 130,000 clients
worldwide (AccessData, 2015). Although, these software tools can be used to
automate the process of evidence retrieval, the location in which the data was
stored is still diﬀerent for each device. Law enforcement oﬃcers use the automated
tools to make the process easier and faster, but they still need to verify that the
tools work properly (Guo et al., 2009). For example, if the tool found an evidence
item, the investigator needed to manually go to the location in which that item was
found to verify that the evidence was there and that the tool found it correctly
(Guo et al., 2009). The recovery and analysis of digital media is tedious.
The details and the knowledge that are required to complete a cyberforensics
investigation can make it diﬃcult to complete in a timely manner. Now that larger
storage drives are readily available and relatively cheap, it is becoming more and
more popular to ﬁnd digital media devices that contain large amounts of data. A
one terabyte drive, the equivalent of 60 stacks of computer paper as tall as the Eiﬀel
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Tower, is not uncommon to ﬁnd (Anon, 2010). Having to search this amount of
data could take a long time (Goodison et al., 2015). Therefore, the automated tools
are being used to help speed up that process. Even with these automated tools, it
takes time. Due to the amount of time it takes law enforcement agencies to
complete the cyberforensics investigations, the number of crimes committed, and
the amount of digital evidence involved in those crimes, there is a backlog of digital
media devices that need to be examined (Cohen, 2007). This backlog continues to
grow. These are some of the many issues that the cyberforensics community faces.

2.5 Cyberforensics Laboratories
In order to help mitigate the issues the cyberforensics community faces, the
FBI established the Regional Computer Forensics Laboratory (RCFL) model
(Schmitknecht, 2004). This model would allow for a partnership and better
collaboration between the FBI and other local law enforcement agencies to work
together on cases providing more personnel and knowledge sharing between the
agencies (Schmitknecht, 2004). According to the 2013 annual report, the FBI has 16
RCFL locations currently established (RCFL, 2013). These RCFLs are located in
Chicago, Greater Houston, Heart of America, Intermountain West, Kentucky,
Miami Valley, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Texas, Northwest, Orange County,
Philadelphia, Rocky Mountain, San Diego, Silicon Valley, and Western New York.
In 2009, the RCFLs processed more than 6,000 examinations for 689 law
enforcement agencies. The amount of digital evidence processed was 2,300
Terabytes (TB), which is about the contents of 230 academic libraries (RCFL,
2009). In 2013, the RCFLs helped 826 agencies and completed 7,273 digital
examinations (RCFL, 2013). This consisted of 5,973 TB of data. Although, the
RCFLs aided in many investigations, the RCFLs are not located in every state, and
their primary focus are the federal cases and therefore, many local agencies are not
getting the help they need.
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Some states, in order to help solve this problem, established specialized
cyberforensic units. However, research regarding the success of these units has yet
to be conducted. The current study will assess these specialized units to determine
if they are operating more eﬃciently and more eﬀectively.

2.6 Summary
Digital forensics is a relatively new ﬁeld compared to the other forensic
science sub-disciplines. Since the digital forensics ﬁeld is still new, computer forensic
processing models and procedures have not yet been standardized. Therefore, in
order to complete digital forensic investigations, it is best to follow the
“best-practice” notion developed by the National Institute of Justice. There are
many challenges law enforcement agencies encounter when processing digital media.
The amount of digital devices needed to be analyzed is overwhelming. The
procedures for processing digital evidence can be time consuming due to the amount
of data digital media can store, not all law enforcement oﬃcers have the training to
process digital media, and the diﬀerent software installed on the digital media can
change the procedure for processing the evidence. These challenges and the
constant incoming ﬂow of digital evidence is causing a backlog of evidence and
makes it diﬃcult for local law enforcement agencies to process the digital media in
an eﬀective manner. Law enforcement agencies have begun to address this problem
by creating specialized cybercrime units to speciﬁcally process digital media.
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CHAPTER 3. FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY
The goal of this analysis was to determine whether the specialized
cybercrime units were helping to process digital evidence more eﬃciently and
eﬀectively. It was expected the specialized units would perform at a better rate and
quality than they were before the units were established.
In this study, a specialized cybercrime unit was a unit focused speciﬁcally on
processing digital media and one that processed the digital evidence within their
own unit. Non-specialized units were all other cyberforensic units. Also, the number
of cases and digital evidence devices processed was used to measure eﬃciency. To
measure eﬀectiveness, a reduction in the backlog and time to close a case was
required.
In order to complete this analysis, data was retrieved from diﬀerent
cybercrime units throughout the United States. These units were classiﬁed as a
specialized or non-specialized unit. The units were then analyzed for their
eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency. A comparative analysis was completed using the
specialized units verses the non-specialized units in order to determine if the
specialized units were operating more eﬃciently and eﬀectively. This chapter
explains more about the data collection process and the analysis used to determine
how well the cybercrime units were performing.

3.1 Hypothesis
Since specialized cybercrime units focus solely on digital evidence, the
processing of digital media would be completed more eﬃciently and eﬀectively.
The hypothesis for this study was the following:
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Hα : The specialized cybercrime units process digital media more
eﬃciently and eﬀectively than the non-specialized units.

3.2 Unit & Sampling
The following section discusses the participants of the study, the data
retrieval process, and the analysis.

3.2.1 Sample
Throughout the United States, law enforcement agencies have cybercrime
units. A law enforcement agency from each state, including the District of
Columbia, was contacted to determine if a cybercrime unit existed. In order to ﬁnd
these cybercrime units, Internet searches were completed to ﬁnd digital forensic
crime units associated with each state and a phone number associated with the
units. A list of all these agencies was compiled. Then the phone number associated
with the unit was called. Some of the phone numbers associated with the units were
for forensic laboratories, attorney general’s oﬃces, and others were the actual unit
itself. Therefore, upon calling these phone numbers, some provided other contact
information speciﬁcally for the cybercrime units. After contacting all of the states,
20 cybercrime units responded in favor of participating in the study. This was a
response rate of about 39%.

3.2.2 Data Retrieval
Two surveys were conducted to determine if the cybercrime units were
processing digital media more eﬃciently and eﬀectively. Data collection included
the use of phone interviews and an online survey. The phone interview acted as a
qualitative analysis, and the online survey provided quantitative data. Two sets of
surveys were created for the online questionnaire, one for specialized units and one
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for non-specialized units. The only diﬀerence in the questions for the specialized
units was to obtain additional numerical data from the unit before and after it was
created.
Online research provided information to ﬁnd the cybercrime units and their
contact information, as stated in the previous section. Phone calls were made to ﬁnd
the personnel within the cybercrime units. Once the personnel from the cybercrime
units were reached, they were asked if they would like to participate in the study.
Contact information, such as direct phone numbers and emails, were obtained.
An email was sent to the member of the cybercrime unit (some of the
members were the commander or director of the unit and others were not). This
email stated the purpose of this study and what type of information was gathered to
provide awareness and understanding of the study. Part of this email included the
notiﬁcation to keep the participants of the study conﬁdential and to inform the
participants the data retrieved would be anonymized and aggregated.
A time for the phone interview was then scheduled through phone calls
and/or through emails.
The phone interview was conducted ﬁrst to gain general knowledge about the
unit, including when it was established, who was involved, and what counties the
unit has served. Knowledge about why the unit was established, what was the
purpose for opening the unit, what problems were occurring before the unit was
created, whether the interviewee believes the unit has or has not been successful,
and why it has or has not been successful was collected during this interview. This
interview took approximately 30 minutes to complete.
The questions were developed prior to the interview. Some additional
questions, however, were asked depending on the answers of the interviewees.
Therefore, the interview was conducted in a semi-structured manner. The questions
asked were open-ended questions. Some of the questions were based on previous
research regarding the units to ensure the data retrieved was complete. These
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interviews were also recorded for veriﬁcation and validity of the study and of the
notes taken during the interview.
The next part of the data collection process was quantitative and was more
diﬃcult because not all agencies keep the same type of statistics. The ideal
collection of data consisted of the following data:
• number of mobile phones examined
• number of hard drives examined
• number of other digital media devices examined (eg. Kindle, iPad)
• number of leads reported to National Center for Missing and Exploited
Children (NCMEC)
• number of cases sent to the Internet Crimes Complaint Center (IC3)
• number of computer crime cases
• average time spent on each type of case
Ideally, for specialized units, the units would have this collection data from before
the specialized unit was created as well as after the unit created.
The quantitative data was retrieved via the online survey. This method of data
collection allowed the survee to respond to these questions once the answers were
obtained and to take their time answering them more than an on-the-spot interview
would. Two online surveys were created using the Qualtrics tool. Qualtrics is a
web-based survey software tool. Qualtrics allows the author of the survey to create
the questions and to anonymize the respondents. The online survey can be
distributed via email or through a link. Once the phone interview was completed, a
link to the online survey was emailed to the cybercrime unit respondent. The link
provided, was either the link to the non-specialized cybercrime unit survey or to the
specialized cybercrime unit survey. The respondents were given a week to complete
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the online survey. For those, who did not complete the survey within ﬁve days, a
reminder email was sent. This survey took approximately 15 minutes to ﬁnish.
Depending on information provided during the phone interview, the
cybercrime unit was classiﬁed as specialized or non-specialized. Many of the units
responded in favor of being specialized, only three did not. However, upon further
internet research on the individual cybercrime units, it was found that some of the
units, according to the deﬁnition in this study, were actually non-specialized.
Therefore, some of the non-specialized units were asked the additional questions
about before the unit was created that were not necessary.
Once this data was retrieved from both the phone interview as well as the
online questionnaire, it was analyzed for all non-specialized and specialized units.

3.2.3 Comparative Analysis
A comparative analysis was completed using the data from the phone
interviews and the online surveys. Analyzing the specialized crime units for the data
before and after the unit was established was used to determine if the units were
more eﬃcient and eﬀective as an individual specialized unit.
Next, an analysis was conducted to determine if the specialized units, in
general, were working more eﬃciently and eﬀectively than the non-specialized units.
In order to complete the comparative analysis for each individual specialized
cybercrime unit, two main tasks were completed. First, the qualitative data
retrieved from the phone interviews was analyzed to determine whether the
interviewee believed the unit to be successful.
The second task for analyzing the data involved comparing the numerical
data received from each of the specialized cybercrime units. The data from before
the unit was established was compared to the data from after the unit was
established. This showed whether the unit made an impact on the backlog of cases
and if it was processing the digital evidence more eﬃciently and eﬀectively. The
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statistical data suggests whether or not the units were processing more digital
evidence and cases.
If the comparative analysis between the specialized and non-specialized units
show the number of cases worked and the number of digital devices processed has
increased, and the backlog and time to close a case has decreased, then the
hypothesis will be correct in saying specialized cybercrime units were operating
more eﬃciently and eﬀectively than non-specialized units.

3.3 Summary
A study was completed to determine whether or not specialized cybercrime
units were working more eﬃciently and eﬀectively to process digital evidence. The
data for this study was collected using two methods: a phone interview and an
online survey. The data was then used in a comparative analysis to determine if the
specialized cybercrime units were working more eﬃciently and eﬀectively than
non-specialized units.
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CHAPTER 4. RESULTS
This chapter provides information from the study and the results from the
comparative analysis. The number of cyberforensic units who agreed to participate
in this study consisted of 20 units. All 20 units participated in the phone interview.
However, only 16 out of the 20 units interviewed answered the online survey. Each
of the units were classiﬁed as specialized or non-specialized based on two criteria.
The ﬁrst was whether or not the unit focused solely on cyberforensic cases and the
second was whether or not the unit processed all of the digital media within their
own unit. Upon classifying the units as specialized and non-specialized, the units
that participated in the phone interview included 12 specialized and eight
non-specialized. The online survey included eight specialized units and eight
non-specialized units.
The participating units were found throughout the United States. The
breakdown of the regions in which the survey participants were located is shown in
Table 4.1. The regions are split into four categories: Paciﬁc, Mountain, Central and
Eastern.
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Table 4.1
Generalized Geographical Location of Participating Units

The ﬁndings from both the phone interview as well as the online
questionnaire are presented throughout this chapter.

4.1 Unit Descriptives
The phone interview was conducted to provide information about the unit.
This part of the analysis was qualitative. The type of questions asked in this
interview were developed to determine when and how the unit was set up. The
questions also involved who the unit served and what type of cases the unit worked
on.

4.1.1 Setup of the Unit
There were primarily four reasons for creating the units, regardless if the
unit was specialized or non-specialized. The ﬁrst reason was there was no one
handling the digital evidence. Second, there was a continuous increase in digital
evidence being seized. Third, they needed and wanted to share the resources.
Finally, the last reason was the units were created to assist in crimes and provide
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protection to the victims. Many of the units, 75% (n = 15), stated the primary
reasons for creating the unit was because no one was processing the digital evidence
and there was an increase in digital evidence.
Additional data regarding the agency primarily in charge of the cybercrime
unit, the number of locations each unit contained, the year in which the unit was
established, the number of counties the unit served, the number of personnel
(including law enforcement oﬃcers and civilian personnel) involved in the unit, and
whether or not the unit was a multi-agency unit is shown in Table 4.2. This data
was meant to describe how the units were structured.
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Table 4.2
Cybercrime Unit Structure

The units were typically overseen, or commanded, by a single person. The
title of this person may be a Sergeant, Chief, Lieutenant, Captain, Special Agent, or
Civilian Supervisor. While the commander may oversee the unit, not all of the
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commanders work within the cybercrime unit. One of the units, was not overseen
by a single person, but by a board of individuals (some of which were in the unit
and some were not).

4.2 Hypothesis Testing
The hypothesis for this study was specialized cybercrime units would process
digital media more eﬃciently and eﬀectively than the non-specialized units. To
measure eﬃciency, there must be an increase in the number of cases and digital
devices processed. Eﬀectiveness was measured by the reduction in the backlog of
cases and the time to close a case.

4.2.1 Eﬃciency Testing
One limitation stated in the methodology was whether or not the units kept
data and whether or not they kept the same data. This limitation was seen in the
data the units provided via the online survey regarding the number of cases
processed before and after the unit was created. The data for the number of cases
processed is shown in Table 4.3.
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Table 4.3
Number of Cases Among the Units

As seen by the data in Table 4.3, the data is not uniform among the units.
Some of the units did not know the number of cases processed before the unit was
created. Only one specialized unit did not provide any data for the number of cases
processed at all. The data also shows some of the values were given in cases per
year and some in total cases throughout the years of the unit’s existence. During
the phone interview, respondents stated there were a small number of digital cases,
if any at all, being analyzed prior to creating the unit. This statement along with
the numbers provided for after the unit was created show an increase in the number
of cases. However, due to the data inconsistencies it is diﬃcult to successfully
analyze the number of cases processed.
Each case has a diﬀerent amount of devices associated with it. The speciﬁc
devices inquired about were computer hard drives, mobile phones, USB drives,
kindles, ipads, and other tablets, gaming consoles, and other devices. Only one
respondent added a speciﬁc device to the list. The added device was Micro SD
cards. The data obtained from the units is displayed in Table 4.4. There were three
units that did not provide any data regarding any of the devices. Out of the
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remaining units, many of them did not keep information about the speciﬁc devices
prior to establishing the unit. Out of the 13 units that did keep data, two (15%) of
them had a decrease in the number of computer hard drives being processed. One of
those two units was a newly established unit who had yet to see results regarding
their unit.
Only one of the 13 units (8%) decreased in number of mobile phones
analyzed. This decrease was also due to the newly created unit, who could not
provide data for the time period after the unit’s creation.
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Table 4.4
Types of Digital Evidence Processed Before and After the Unit Was Created
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The two types of devices processed regularly among the units were computer
hard drives and mobile devices. The number of USB drives processed after
establishing the unit was the next largest category of devices processed. Regardless
of whether or not the unit was specialized, individual units that provided data for
both prior to the unit’s creation as well as after the unit’s creatio showed there was
an increase in number of devices being analyzed.

4.2.2 Eﬀectiveness Testing
There were two criteria used to test eﬀectiveness. These criteria included the
reduction in backlog and a reduction in time to close a case.

4.2.2.1. Backlog

Upon analyzing digital evidence, the units reported a wide range of time for
the backlogged cases. As shown in Table 4.5, about half of the units have a backlog
of three months or less. However, due to the wide range of values it was diﬃcult to
compare the non-specialized units to the specialized units. The backlog for 66.7% (n
= 8) of the specialized units was three months or less. This value was more than
50% (n = 4) of the non-specialized units.
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Table 4.5
Backlog Among the Units

A t test was conducted to assess the mean diﬀerence between specialized and
non-specialized units on the backlog provided after the units were created. The
months reported were used in this analysis and not the combined categories provided
in Table 4.5. The t test shows the diﬀerences between two means. The t test showed
there was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the backlog of the specialized (M = 3.2,
SD = 3.4) and non-specialized units (M = 5.9, SD = 6.4), t(16) = -1.14, p = .27.
While the descriptive statistics do not show a signiﬁcant diﬀerence among
the non-specialized and the specialized units for the reduction in backlog, the values
provided by the units suggest there was a diﬀerence. The backlog for 66.7% (n = 8)
of the specialized units had a backlog of three months or less. For the
non-specialized units, 50% (n = 4) of them had a backlog of three months or less.
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4.2.2.2. Time to Close Cases
The time spent on a case was diﬀerent between the units. The data from before
and after the unit was created is shown in Table 4.6. The data from the units that
provided an answer to this question shows the majority of the time taken to close a
case was less than six months, regardless if the unit was specialized or
non-specialized.
Table 4.6
Time Spent to Close Cases

Another t test was completed to test the mean diﬀerence between specialized
units and the non-specialized units based on the time taken to close a case. The
t-test stated there was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence for the time taken to close a case
between the specialized (M = 1.8, SD = 0.8) and non-specialized units (M = 2.0,
SD = 0.5), t(11) = -.53, p = .61. On average, both units reported approximately
less than one month to close a case.

4.3 Exploratory Analysis
Due to the anticipation of a lack of records kept by the units, exploratory
analyses were conducted beyond the hypothesis to better understand the specialized
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and non-specialized units. The next section discusses the ﬁndings from the
exploratory analyses.

4.3.1 Unit Funding
The funding of these units is an important factor to consider. In order to
establish and maintain the units, some of the units received funding from diﬀerent
agencies as shown in Table 4.7. The data shows the units were created with limited
funding. However, in order to maintain the unit funding was more likely obtained.
The units that received funding upon creating the unit received the funding from
the Department of Justice (DOJ), the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), a state
funded grant, or a federal funded grant. In order to maintain the unit, the majority
of the funding came from the DOJ using the Internet Crimes Against Children
(ICAC) distribution money, however, other grants were received through the NIJ,
the United States Secret Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other
state funded organizations. The units that were considered multi-agency units that
paired with a University had more opportunities to receive grant funding, primarily
from NIJ.
Table 4.7
Cybercrime Unit Funding
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4.3.2 Unit Certiﬁcations and Tools
There are many diﬀerent certiﬁcations available for cyberforensic
laboratories. A specialized certiﬁcation for crime laboratories is the American
Society of Crime Lab Directors (ASCLD) certiﬁcation. Many of the units, 19 out of
20 units (95%) responded they were not ASCLD certiﬁed. The single unit, a
non-specialized unit, that responded they were ASCLD certiﬁed, stated it was their
parent laboratory that was ASCLD certiﬁed. There was one (5%) unit planning to
get ASCLD certiﬁed within the next ﬁve years. Another two (10%) units stated
they were inquiring about the ASCLD certiﬁcation. There were seven units (35%)
that looked into getting the certiﬁcation, but decided against it. They stated the
certiﬁcation was too costly or the ASCLD requirements do not make sense in the
digital world.
The personnel within the units have diﬀerent certiﬁcations. The certiﬁcations
among the units included the International Association of Computer Investigative
Specialists (IACIS) certiﬁcation, the Seized Computer Evidence Recovery Specialist
(SCERS), the FBI Computer Analysis and Response Team (CART) certiﬁcation,
Peace Oﬃcer certiﬁcation, or the Global Information Assurance Certiﬁcation
(GIAC). These certiﬁcations are used to train individuals about cyberforensic
investigations. Vendor speciﬁc certiﬁcations among the units included AccessData
Certiﬁed Examiner (ACE), EnCase Certiﬁed Examiner (EnCE), Cellebrite, A+,
Security+, Network+, and many more. These vendor certiﬁcations are for speciﬁc
tools or for speciﬁc cyberforensic topics. The details of the certiﬁcations the
specialized units had verses the non-specialized units are shown in Table 4.8.
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Table 4.8
Cybercrime Unit Certiﬁcations

Some of the vendor speciﬁc certiﬁcations provide information about some of
the tools the units used. While some tools have certiﬁcations available not all of
them do. The units provided many diﬀerent tools used during their investigations.
The diﬀerent tools used range widely. However, there were ﬁve tools used by most
of the units. These tools, in order of most used, were AccessData’s FTK and
Cellebrite both being used in 90% (n = 18) of the units. Internet Evidence Finder
was used by 75% (n = 15) of the units. Encase was used by 60% (n = 12) of the
units. Finally, X-Ways Forensics was used by 50% (n = 10) of the units. Katana
Forensics Lantern, BlackBag’s BlackLight, Oxygen Forensics and Susteen were
among some of the additional tools used.
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Although some of the unit personnel may have been specialized in certain
areas, for the most part, speciﬁc roles for processing digital evidence were not
assigned to speciﬁc people. The personnel processed all types of digital evidence
and not just the digital evidence for their specialized areas. Only 10% (n = 2) of
the units, needed to send their evidence to outside agencies, such as the RCFL, for
processing (this did not include the units that did not have advanced forensic
techniques such as JTAG and need to send the digital evidence out for this type of
analysis).
When conducting an investigation and processing the digital evidence, 95%
(n = 19) of the units follow some set of standard operating procedures. Many of the
units could not provide a speciﬁc set of standard procedures, but stated they follow
the “best-practice” standards among the digital forensics community.

4.3.3 Unit Cases
There are many diﬀerent aspects of a digital forensic case. The case may be
classiﬁed as federal, state, or local. There are also many diﬀerent types of cases,
such as child pornography related cases, drug related cases, or homicide related
cases. Each of these cases may require a diﬀerent type of digital forensic analysis,
such as computer forensics, mobile forensics, or network forensics. Data was
obtained about each of these items from the units.

4.3.3.1. Case Classiﬁcation

The classiﬁcation of cases (federal, state, or local) in which the units work
diﬀers among the units. Figure 4.1 shows the diﬀerences in percentage of cases
worked by specialized and non-specialized units. Both the specialized and
non-specialized units work on state and local cases. The federal cases are primarily
worked on by specialized units.
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Figure 4.1. Shows the number of units working on federal, state and local cases.

Using percentages obtained from the online questionnaire, a more detailed
analysis of the time spent on federal, state, and local cases was obtained. Table 4.9
shows the percentage of time spent on federal, state and local cases among the 16
units who responded to the online questionnaire.
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Table 4.9
Number of Units Working on Federal, State and Local Cases.
Unit Classiﬁcation

PoT Units Work

Federal

State

Local

0-20

7 (87.5)

3 (37.5)

3 (37.5)

21-40

1 (12.5)

1 (12.5)

1 (12.5)

41-60

-

2 (25.0)

1 (12.5)

61-80

-

2 (25.0)

1 (12.5)

81-100

-

0 (0.0)

2 (25.0)

0-20

7 (87.5)

3 (37.5)

2 (25.0)

21-40

0 (0.0)

3 (37.5)

0 (0.0)

41-60

-

1 (12.5)

3 (37.5)

61-80

1 (12.5)

0 (0.0)

0 (0.0)

81-100

-

1 (12.5)

3 (37.5)

Specialized (n = 8)

Non-Specialized (n = 8)

Note. Values represent frequencies with percentages in parentheses.
*Any percentage disparities due to rounding.
PoT = Percentage of time

4.3.3.2. Types of Crime
The type of crime in which the units work also diﬀered. A small portion of units,
two (10%), were limited to felony crimes only. One of these felony-focused units was
specialized and the other was non-specialized. The majority of the units worked on
all types of crimes, with some focusing on crimes against children. The number of
units who worked on the diﬀerent types of crimes are shown in Table 4.10.
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Table 4.10
Number of Units Working on Speciﬁc Types of Crimes.
Type of Crime

Specialized (n = 12)

Non-Specialized (n = 8)

All Types of Crime

5 (41.7)

2 (25.0)

Focus on CAC, but Work All

6 (50.0)

3 (37.5)

Only CAC

0 (0.0)

2 (25.0)

Only Felonies

1 (8.3)

1 (12.5)

Note. Values represent frequencies with percentages in parentheses.
*Any percentage disparities due to rounding.
CAC = Crimes Against Children

The types of cases that involve digital evidence among the units include, but
are not limited to, child pornography cases, drug cases, homicide cases, robbery
cases, sexual assault cases, and fraud cases. The percentage of time spent on child
pornography cases involving digital evidence is high compared to the other crimes
regardless if the units are specialized or non-specialized. The average percentage of
time spent on each type of case involving digital evidence are shown in Table 4.11.
Only two (12.5%) of the units did not spend the majority of the time on child
pornography cases. One of these two units did not work on any child pornography
cases. They sent their cases to the RCFL.

43

Table 4.11
Average Percentage of Time Spent On Speciﬁc Crimes

4.3.3.3. Types of Digital Forensics

When processing digital forensic cases, the online questionnaire assessed the
type of digital forensic investigations conducted by the unit (e.g., computer
forensics, mobile forensics, network forensics, malware forensics, video forensics,
social media forensics, vehicle forensics, audio forensics, and camera forensics).
According to the data shown in Table 4.12, all 16 of the units work on both
computer forensics and mobile forensics. The data also shows that non-specialized
units conduct malware forensics more frequently than specialized units.
The most prevalent type of digital forensics completed by all of the units
were computer forensics and mobile forensics. Computer forensics was the most
prevalent type of digital forensics among 31% (n = 5) of the units. Mobile forensics
was the most prevalent among 69% (n = 11) of the units.
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Table 4.12
Types of Digital Forensics Involved in the Cases

Between all 16 units, the majority of their time was spent as digital forensic
examiners. Only two (12.5%) units reported spending more time as an investigator
verses as a digital forensic examiner. The units spent at least 75% of their time as a
digital forensic examiner 87.5% (n = 14) of the time.

4.3.4 Organizations Aiding in Digital Forensic Cases
Two widely known organizations that aid law enforcement with cybercrime
cases are NCMEC and IC3. NCMEC is an organization that helps with child
exploitation cases. Only nine of the 16 units (56%) responded with data about the
NCMEC leads obtained before and after the units were created. All of the units
that responded had an increase in number of NCMEC leads. The data for NCMEC
leads are shown in Table 4.13.
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Table 4.13
Number of NCMEC Leads and IC3 Reports

The IC3 organization helps in crimes related to fraud and other internet
related crimes (excluding child exploitation cases). A smaller number of units report
incidents to the IC3. Only four of the 16 units (25%) responded with data for IC3
reports. One of the four units (25%) had a reduction in the number of IC3 reports
from before and after the unit was created. Another unit only had one additional
report to the IC3 organization from before and after the unit was created. The data
for the IC3 reports is shown in Table 4.13.

4.4 Unit Recommendation
During the phone interview, the interviewee was asked if they believed the
unit was successful, 75% (n = 15) of the respondents stated the unit was successful.
They stated they believed the unit was doing well in processing the digital evidence
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and the court success rates were good. Twenty-ﬁve percent of the units responded
the unit had not succeeded mostly due to the need for more personnel. One unit,
stated they were not successful yet because the unit was a fairly new unit and had
not had the opportunity to see success or failure yet. The comparison between the
specialized and non-specialized units is shown in Table 4.14 and shows the success
rate to be the same among both types of units.
Table 4.14
Successful Unit
Success

Specialized (n = 12)

Non-Specialized (n = 8)

Yes

9 (75.0)

6 (75.0)

No

3 (25.0)

2 (25.0)

Note.

Values represent frequencies with percentages in

parentheses.
*Any percentage disparities due to rounding.
The interviewee was also asked whether or not the creation of a similar unit
is recommended. There were two responses: yes, absolutely and it depends. None of
the interviewees said no they would not recommend the unit. There were 13 (65%)
units that stated yes, absolutely. Seven (35%) of the units responded it depends.
Upon responding with yes, the reasons provided were a similar unit could help with
the backlog, smaller agencies could use the resources, and technology and digital
evidence is continuously increasing. Those that responded it depends, stated it is
incredibly expensive to operate this type of unit, it depends on the types of
problems being faced, and it depends if there is a need for it.
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Table 4.15
Unit Creation Recommendation
Recommend

Specialized (n = 12)

Non-Specialized (n = 8)

Yes

8 (66.7)

5 (62.5)

No

4 (33.3)

3 (37.5)

Note.

Values represent frequencies with percentages in

parentheses.
*Any percentage disparities due to rounding.

The breakdown between the specialized and non-specialized units is shown in
Table 4.15. Both the specialized and non-specialized have similar rates for
recommendation as well.

4.5 Summary
The data retrieved from the phone interviews as well as the online
questionnaires provided many insights about the units. However, due to the
limitations of the data for the number of cases and digital devices processed it
cannot be determined if the specialized units were operating more eﬃciently than
the non-specialized units. The limitations of the numbers for the backlog also make
it diﬃcult to show whether or not the specialized units were operating more
eﬀectively than the non-specialized units. Descriptive statistics for the backlog and
the time taken to close a case do show, however, there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence
between the two groups.
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CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION
This study analyzed data collected from diﬀerent cybercrime units from
around the United States. The goal of this study was to show whether or not
specialized cybercrime units process digital media more eﬃciently and eﬀectively
than the non-specialized cybercrime units. In this study, eﬃciency was measured by
an increase in the number of cases and digital evidence items processed.
Eﬀectiveness was measured by the reduction in backlog and time taken to close a
case. This study consisted of two surveys: a phone interview and an online
questionnaire.
There were 20 cybercrime units that participated in the phone interview and
16 cybercrime units in the online questionnaire. Therefore, the study had an
unbalanced design. The purpose of the phone interview was to gather qualitative
data about the unit. This qualitative data included information about the unit’s
structure, its creation, grant funding, the certiﬁcations and tools used by the unit,
and the unit’s backlog. The online questionnaire was used to obtain the quantitative
data. This data included information about the cases, such as the type of cases, the
digital forensics involved, the number of cases, the number of devices, and the time
taken to close a case. The data each of the units kept, limited the ﬁndings of this
study. Therefore, there is not enough data to show a statistical diﬀerence between
the eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency of the specialized and non-specialized units.
The results showed, the specialized units have a larger number of locations
and have more personnel (especially law enforcement oﬃcers) within the units. The
number of personnel within the units was a concern that many of the units had.
The lack of personnel was the primary reason for those that stated they were not
successful.
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The specialized units were more likely to be a multi-agency unit. The
multi-agency units had two advantages. First, the units found it more cost eﬀective
to share the resources they had among all the agencies involved in the unit. Second,
the units working with universities had more opportunities to obtain grant funding.
Funding was also another large concern for the units. While many of the
units received funding for their work with ICAC cases, these units are expensive to
open and operate. Therefore, applying for grant funding may be beneﬁcial to many
of these units. In order to apply for these grants, many units need to have and
certify that they follow a standard set of procedures.
The standard procedures for processing digital media among the units
diﬀered greatly. The units stated they followed standard procedures, however, many
of them could not name a particular set of procedures. This problem coincides with
the argument made by previous literature that the digital forensic community has
yet to develop a standard set of procedures to encompass all digital investigations
(Casey, 2011; Rogers, 2007). The lack of knowledge regarding what set of standard
procedures the units follow may be used in court by defense attorneys, especially
the unit that stated no standard procedures were followed. It also shows the lack of
agreed upon standards within the digital forensic community.
The certiﬁcations the unit personnel possessed diﬀered among the specialized
and non-specialized units. The specialized units were more likely to have been
IACIS certiﬁed, while the non-specialized units were certiﬁed through many
diﬀerent programs other than IACIS. Previous studies showed certiﬁcations to be a
leading issue within the digital forensic community (Breitinger & Baggili, 2015;
Rogers & Seigfried, 2004). IACIS is an international cyberforensic training program
and would be beneﬁcial to obtain.
According to the structure of the units, it is beneﬁcial to create a specialized
unit if the unit needs more personnel, more funding opportunities, and the IACIS
certiﬁcation.
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This study also showed a wide range of tools used by each of the units.
There were three tools in which most of the units used, AccessData’s FTK,
Cellebrite, and Internet Evidence Finder. While there were three main tools all of
the units used, there were many tools in which only a couple units used. The wide
range of tools supports previous research that stated tools were an issue among the
cyberforensic community (Breitinger & Baggili, 2015; Rogers & Seigfried, 2004).
Besides the three main tools, the community does not have a standard set of tools
to conduct investigations.
For the cases processed within the units, the classiﬁcation, types of crime,
and types of digital forensics were similar. The two main diﬀerences between the
units were specialized units were more likely to work on federal cases and
non-specialized units were more likely to conduct malware forensics. Therefore, the
cases processed among the specialized or non-specialized units should not be used to
determine if a specialized unit is more beneﬁcial.
Upon analyzing the data used to support or refute the hypothesis, the
limitations of this study were reached. The two main limitations of this study were
the units may not keep records of the digital evidence processed and the units may
not keep the same records of digital media analyzed. Many of the units did not keep
records from before the unit was created. Therefore, the data from before and after
the unit was created could not be compared. The data provided by the units was
also diﬀerent. Some of the units provided yearly data verses the total amount of
data. This problem occurred when analyzing the data for the number of cases and
digital devices processed. Therefore, it was diﬃcult to analyze the data to show
whether or not the specialized units were more eﬃcient.
Looking at the data from the units, without calculating descriptive statistics,
does show an increase in the number of cases regardless if the unit was specialized
or non-specialized. This is consistent with analyzing more cases, and it may also be
consistent with the increase in crimes involving digital evidence and therefore, more
cases being analyzed.
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The data reported for the backlog among the units was not kept by many of
the units prior to their creation. However, descriptive statistics were calculated to
provide information about the backlog after the unit was created and the time taken
to close cases. The descriptive data showed there was not a signiﬁcant diﬀerence
among the means between the specialized and non-specialized units. However, the
data provided by the units did suggest that more specialized units have a lower
backlog. If a larger sample size was analyzed, it is likely there will be a statistical
diﬀerence in the backlog among the specialized and non-specialized units.
Therefore, with a larger sample size, it is likely the specialized units operate more
eﬀectively than the non-specialized units.
While the data was diﬃcult to analyze according to the deﬁnitions provided
in this study of eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness, insights did provide support for creating
the specialized units. The structure of the specialized units showed, in general, the
number of cases and digital devices processed has increased, and in general, the
backlog of cases for specialized units was lower than non-specialized units.

5.1 Recommendations
The data from this study provided many interesting insights, however, it may
be better to analyze the units on a year to year basis rather than before the unit was
created and after the unit was created. Another aspect of this study that can be
improved upon is the number of units analyzed. While a reasonable amount of units
responded to this survey, the variables were changing quite a lot with a single unit
answering diﬀerently than others. This in part was due to the inconsistent records
kept by the units as well as the lack of answers from some of the units. Therefore,
while it would be diﬃcult for the units to determine all of the data from previous
years, it is recommended that a standard set of records be kept by all units.
Upon contacting the Regional Computer Forensic Laboratory (RCFL), it was
found that the records they keep per year are:
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• Number of cases
- From which agency did the case come from
- Is the case federal, state, or local
• What crime types involve digital media (e.g. homicide, robbery, drug)
• Number of hard drives
• Number of cell phones
• Number of ﬂash drives
• Number of digital cameras
• Total number of Gigabytes processed throughout the year
• Number of devices running Windows, Linux, Unix, or Macintosh
While the RCFL did not mention keeping the following records, it is recommended
that the additional items be recorded per year:
• Number of kindles, iPads, and other tablets
• Number of gaming consoles
• Backlog in number of months
• Average time it takes to close a case
• Number of personnel working on crimes involving digital media
• Operating budget
Having a standardized set of data from all the cybercrime units will help to provide
more quality data. These records can also be used to obtain grants. Many grants,
such as NIJ, ask for these types of records to fulﬁll their evidence-based policy.
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5.2 Summary
This study presents many diﬀerent ﬁndings for both non-specialized and
specialized units. Although the records among the units are not consistent, it was
still possible to determine that the specialized units in general were operating more
eﬀectively. A larger sample size may provide more conclusive ﬁndings. Many
improvements can be made upon this study and can be conducted in the future,
however, this is a good basis point for analyzing all cybercrime units.
The questionnaire developed can provide a basis point for future research.
The questions in which the interviewees did not necessarily understand can be
worded diﬀerently. The questions in which surprising answers were found can also
be worded diﬀerently and/or expanded upon to obtain a better understanding of
these answers.
More future work could include the analysis of units in other countries. This
study focused on units within the United States and while there are some similar
organizations that operate similarly there are some in which their structure is
diﬀerent. The types of cases being worked on in Europe are more complicated than
the cases in the US (Europol, 2016).
The recommendations for a standard set of records among digital forensic
practitioners can be beneﬁcial to the practitioners as well as the researchers. The
practitioners can use the records to write eﬀective grants to apply for more funding
and can also show what the unit is doing well in and what they need to improve.
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GDWDZRXOGEHEHVW3OHDVHDQVZHUWKHTXHVWLRQVDVRIWRGD\¶VGDWHXQOHVVVSHFLILHGRWKHUZLVH





:KDWLVWKHQDPHRI\RXUGLJLWDOIRUHQVLFVXQLW"
:KHUHLV\RXUXQLWORFDWHG"
:KDW\HDUZDV\RXUXQLWHVWDEOLVKHG"
2XWRIDWRWDORIDSSUR[LPDWHO\ZKDWSHUFHQWDJHRI\RXUXQLW¶VFDVHVDUH)HGHUDO
6WDWHDQG/RFDO"
 7RGDWHZKLFKFRXQWLHVKDV\RXUXQLWVHUYHG"
 +RZPDQ\FDVHVLQYROYLQJGLJLWDOHYLGHQFHGLGWKHXQLWZRUN"
 'R\RXSURFHVVDOORI\RXUGLJLWDOHYLGHQFHZLWKLQWKHXQLW"
 2XWRIZKDWSHUFHQWDJHRI\RXUXQLW¶VWLPHLVVSHQWDVDGLJLWDOIRUHQVLFH[DPLQHU
YVLQYHVWLJDWRUIRUFDVHVLQYROYLQJGLJLWDOHYLGHQFH"
 :KDWW\SHVRIGLJLWDOIRUHQVLFVGRHVWKHXQLWFRQGXFW"6HOHFWDOOWKDWDSSO\
D &RPSXWHUIRUHQVLFV GHDGER[IRUHQVLFVKDUGGULYHV 
E 0RELOHIRUHQVLFV
F 1HWZRUNIRUHQVLFV
G 0DOZDUHIRUHQVLFV
H 9LGHRIRUHQVLFV
I 2WKHU
:KLFKRIWKHVHW\SHVRIGLJLWDOIRUHQVLFVLVPRVWSUHYDOHQWLQ\RXUXQLW"
D &RPSXWHUIRUHQVLFV GHDGER[IRUHQVLFVKDUGGULYHV 
E 0RELOHIRUHQVLFV
F 1HWZRUNIRUHQVLFV
G 0DOZDUHIRUHQVLFV
H 9LGHRIRUHQVLFV
I 2WKHU
$SSUR[LPDWHO\KRZPDQ\RIWKHIROORZLQJGHYLFHVGRHVWKHXQLWVXFFHVVIXOO\DQDO\]H"
D &RPSXWHU+DUG'ULYHV
E 0RELOH3KRQHV
F 86%'ULYHV
G .LQGOHVL3DGVDQGRWKHUWDEOHWV
H *DPLQJ&RQVROHV ;ER[3OD\6WDWLRQ 
I 2WKHU
:KDWLVWKHDYHUDJHYROXPHRUVWRUDJHFDSDFLW\RIGLJLWDOHYLGHQFHSURFHVVHGE\WKHXQLW
HJ0%*%7% "
:KDWLVWKHDYHUDJHWLPHVSHQWRQDFDVHZLWKLQWKHXQLW"
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D /HVVWKDQDZHHN
E /HVVWKDQDPRQWK
F /HVVWKDQVL[PRQWKV
G /HVVWKDQD\HDU
H 0RUHWKDQ\HDU
2XWRIZKDWSHUFHQWDJHRI\RXUXQLW¶VFDVHVWKDWLQYROYHGLJLWDOHYLGHQFHDUHWKH
IROORZLQJ
D &KLOGSRUQRJUDSK\
E 'UXJ
F +RPLFLGH
G 5REEHU\
H 2WKHU
+RZPDQ\1&0(&,&$&OHDGVGRHVWKHXQLWUHFHLYH"
+RZPDQ\,&UHSRUWVGRHVWKHXQLWVXEPLW"


